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UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LA W REVIEW
Shaffer v. Heitner-The Demise of Quasi
In Rem Jurisdiction?
In a recent decision, the Supreme Court extended the re-
quirement of minimum contacts for assertions of in personam
jurisdiction to assertions of in rem and quasi in rem jurisdiction.
The Court recognized that historical justifications for basing ju-
risdiction on the mere presence of property within the jurisdiction
were no longer viable. The author argues that although the case
was properly decided, the decision may prove difficult to apply
and casts serious doubt on previously settled areas of law.
In 1974, a nonresident shareholder in Greyhound Corporation,
a business incorporated in Delaware, filed a shareholder's derivative
suit in Delaware chancery court. The suit alleged that the corpora-
tion, its wholly owned subsidiary-Greyhound Lines, Inc.-and
twenty-eight present and former officers had violated their duties to
the corporation through conduct rendering the corporation liable for
substantial damages in a private antitrust suit and a large fine in a
criminal contempt action.' The misconduct which resulted in the
penalties took place in Oregon. None of the individual defendants
were Delaware residents. In order to compel the general appearance
of the nonresident defendants, plaintiff moved to sequester property
of the individual defendants in Delaware, pursuant to Delaware
Code title 10, section 366.2 Accompanying the motion was an affida-
vit stating that the individual defendants were nonresidents of Del-
aware, and identifying the property to be sequestered as stocks,
options, warrants, and certain corporate rights of defendants. The
court issued the sequestration order the same day the motion was
filed, and pursuant to that order, stop transfer orders were placed
on approximately 82,000 shares of Greyhound common stock be-
longing to nineteen defendants and options belonging to two other
1. The judgment in the antitrust suit was for $13,146,090 plus attorney's fees. Mt. Hood
Stages, Inc. v. Greyhound Corp., No. 68-374 (D. Ore. 1973), aff'd, 555 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1977).
The judgment in the contempt action was for a total of $600,000. United States v. Greyhound
Corp., 363 F. Supp. 525 (N.D. Ill.), 370 F. Supp. 881 (N.D. Ill. 1973), aff'd, 508 F.2d 529 (7th
Cir. 1974).
2. DEL. CODE tit. 10, § 366 permits the court to compel the appearance of the defendant
by the seizure of all or part of his property and to order a sale of such property to pay the
demand of the plaintiff where the defendant does not appear, or otherwise defaults. Any
defendant whose property has been seized and subsequently enters a general appearance can
petition for a release of the property. The burden is then on the plaintiff opposing release to
satisfy the court that such a release will make it substantially less likely that he will obtain
satisfaction of any judgment secured. The court may release the seized property at any time
if sufficient security is posted. DEL. CODE tit. 10, § 366.
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defendants.' The property "seized" was considered to be in Dela-
ware only by virtue of Delaware Code title 8, section 169, which
makes Delaware the statutory situs of the ownership of all stock in
Delaware corporations.4 None of the certificates representing the
seized property were physically present in Delaware. The defen-
dants whose property was seized entered a special appearance to
quash service of process5 and vacate the sequestration order. They
contended that the ex parte sequestration procedure denied them
due process of law, that the property seized was not capable of
attachment in Delaware, and that the basis of the Delaware court's
jurisdiction, the statutory situs of the stock, failed to meet the mini-
mum contacts standard postulated in International Shoe Co. v.
Washington.' The chancery court rejected defendants' procedural
due process arguments7 and held that the Delaware statute estab-
lishing Delaware as the situs of ownership of all stock in Delaware
corporations was constitutional. Furthermore, the court held that
the jurisdiction exercised in the case was quasi in rem,8 founded
upon the presence of the stock, and that consequently the minimum
contacts test for in personam jurisdiction established by
International Shoe was irrelevant. The Delaware Supreme Court
affirmed the judgment of the chancery court.' On appeal,'" the
3. The value of the stock seized was approximately $1.2 million. Shaffer v. Heitner, 97
S. Ct. 2569, 2574 n.7 (1977).
4. DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 169 provides:
For all purposes of title, action, attachment, garnishment and jurisdiction of all
courts held in this state, but not for the purpose of taxation, the situs of the
ownership of the capital stock of all corporations existing under the laws of this
state (Delaware), whether organized under this chapter or otherwise, shall be
regarded as in this State.
5. All 28 defendants were notified of the initiation of the suit by certified mail directed
to their last known addresses and by publication in a Delaware newspaper. 97 S. Ct. at 2574.
6. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
7. The United States Supreme Court declined to address the procedural due process
claim raised below. Shaffer v. Heitner, 97 S. Ct. at 2572. The seizure of property to secure
quasi in rem jurisdiction without notice and a prior hearing raises serious constitutional
questions. Jonnet v. Dollar Savings Bank, 530 F.2d 1123 (3d Cir. 1976). For a discussion of
those problems, see Carrington, The Modern Utility of Quasi In Rem Jurisdiction, 76 HARV.
L. REv. 303 (1962); 31 U. MIAMI L. REv. 419 (1977).
8. In Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 246 n.12 (1958), the Court defined in rem and
quasi in rem jurisdiction, stating:
A judgment in rem affects the interests of all persons in designated property. A
judgment quasi in rem affects the interests of particular persons in designated
property. The latter is of two types. In one the plaintiff is seeking to secure a
preexisting claim in the subject property and to extinquish or establish the nonex-
istence of similar interests of particular persons. In the other the plaintiff seeks
to apply what he concedes to be the property of the defendant to the satisfaction
of a claim against him.
• 9. Greyhound Corp. v. Heitner, 361 A.2d 225 (Del. 1976).
10. The Court concluded that the judgment below was final within the meaning of
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United States Supreme Court held, reversed: The statutory pres-
ence in Delaware of intangible property which was unrelated to the
underlying cause of action provided insufficient minimum contacts
between the litigants, the cause of action, and the forum state for
the exercise of quasi in rem jurisdiction by the Delaware court and
thus violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
to the United States Constitution." Shaffer v. Heitner, 97 S. Ct.
2569 (1977).
At common law, jurisdiction was based upon physical presence,
and required that either the person being sued or the thing being
attached be within the territory." If a defendant disobeyed a verbal
monition to appear, the sheriff was commanded either to attach
certain of his goods which defendant would forfeit if he failed to
appear, or to force the defendant to make certain pledges. If the
defendant failed to appear after his goods were attached or if he had
no goods which could be attached, a writ of capias ad respondendum
was issued. This writ commanded the sheriff to arrest the defendant
if found within the territory and imprison him to answer the plain-
tiff's plea. If the defendant was not within the territory, the action
would proceed against the goods which had been seized.'3
The presence theory of jurisdiction ensured that a judgment
could be satisfied through the sale of attached goods without reli-
ance upon its recognition by other territories. Furthermore, if the
defendant were imprisoned within the territory, his release would be
conditioned upon payment of the judgment. The injured party was
therefore assured of financial redress if he prevailed, and the indi-
section 1257(2) of title 28 of the United States Code (1970), since if it were not considered an
appealable final judgment, appellants would have had the choice of suffering a default judg-
ment or entering a general appearance and defending on the merits. 97 S. Ct. at 2576 n.12.
In so ruling, the Court employed a flexible and pragmatic view in determining the finality of
judgment, noting that the ruling below of the Delaware Supreme Court was surely final on
the underlying constitutional claim. Since requiring appellants to suffer a default or undergo
a trial on the merits would not further illuminate their constitutional claim, the Court's ruling
was appropriate.
11. Jurisdiction in its constitutional dimensions depends upon both the power of the
court to adjudicate the controversy before it and the notice of the proceedings given to the
adverse party. If there are insufficient contacts between the forum state, the controversy and
the parties, the court lacks the power to adjudicate the controversy. International Shoe Co.
v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). Even if the contacts are sufficient to confer the power to
adjudicate, in the absence of adequate notice to an adverse party, the court is constitutionally
unable to exercise its power to adjudicate the controversy before it. Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950). Shaffer dealt only with the power to adjudi-
cate as measured by the minimum contacts test. The Court assumed, without deciding, that
the notice given of the proceedings (service by certified mail) was constitutionally sufficient.
97 S. Ct. at 2585 n.40.
12. J. STORY, CONFLICT OF LAws § 539 (5th ed. 1857).
13. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *281.
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vidual territories were fully capable of collecting judgments ren-
dered in their courts.'
American jurisprudence absorbed the rule that physical pres-
ence was the sole basis of jurisdiction. 5 In 1877, the rule achieved
constitutional dimensions in Pennoyer v. Neff." Neff brought an
action of ejectment in federal district court based on diversity of
citizenship. He challenged the title of Pennoyer to certain real prop-
erty which he had acquired in a sheriff's sale. The sale had been
instituted to satisfy a default judgment obtained in a suit brought
in an Oregon court by a resident creditor against the nonresident
Neff. Service upon Neff was accomplished pursuant to an Oregon
statute which provided for service by publication. The Supreme
Court in Pennoyer refused to honor the Oregon default judgment
against Neff on the basis of defective service. In so holding, Justice
Field's opinion stressed the territorial boundaries of a state's power
to adjudicate and enunciated two principles governing the relation-
ships of the states. Firstly, "every State possesses exclusive jurisdic-
tion and sovereignty over persons and property within its territory"' 7
and secondly, "no State can exercise direct jurisdiction and author-
ity over persons or property without its territory."' 8 The authority
of every tribunal was "necessarily restricted by the territorial limits
of the state in which it is established."' 9 It therefore followed that
although a nonresident defendant could not be sued in a state unless
he was physically present, an in rem action against property within
the state could proceed in the owner's absence.'"
By 1927, the United States Supreme Court began to move away
from territoriality and physical presence as the only bases for in
personam jurisdiction. In Hess v. Pawlowski2' the Court upheld a
Massachusetts statute under which anyone who used the state's
highways impliedly consented to personal jurisdictiQn in an action
arising out of an accident which took place within the state.2 Al-
though Hess marked a departure from the Pennoyer concepts of
territoriality, the holding was narrow as it rested upon the dangers
14. Developments in the Law-State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARV. L. REv. 909, 915-16
(1960).
15. Mills v. Duryee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 481 (1813) (Johnson,. J., dissenting).
16. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
17. Id. at 722.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 720.
20. In Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921) the Court upheld the exercise of quasi in
rem jurisdiction against a challenge to its constitutionality under the due process clause.
21. 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
22. The consent was accomplished through the fiction that a nonresident motorist ap-
pointed a state official as his agent for service of process.. Id.
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attendant to the use of automobiles and the state's police power to
provide for the safety of its residents. The United States Supreme
Court had earlier recognized the state's power to premise jurisdic-
tion over nonresidents on certain activities which the state regu-
lated. 3
The landmark decision of International Shoe Co. v.
Washington24 marked the significant erosion of the "magical and
medieval""5 concepts of territoriality and presence. The Court held
that the systematic and continuous activities of a foreign corpora-
tion within the forum state rendered the corporation amenable to
an in personam action to recover payments due to the state unem-
ployment compensation fund. The new standard was one based
upon fundamental fairness. An analysis of relevant, competing in-
terests would determine whether the exercise of jurisdiction com-
ported with the requirements of the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment to the United States Constitution." The rela-
tionship between the defendant, the forum, and the litigation, in
light of all the circumstances of the particular case would determine
the propriety of in personam jurisdiction.27 The plaintiff's interest
in securing relief from a particular forum must bear a reasonable
relation to the burden placed upon a nonresident defendant forced
23. Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. v. Gulf Issue Mining & Milling Co., 243 U.S. 93 (1917);
Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n v. Phelps, 190 U.S. 147, 158 (1903).
24. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
25. Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d 305, 311, 234 N.E.2d 669, 672, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633,
637 (1967).
26. Chief Justice Stone, writing for the Court, noted:
[N]ow that the capias ad respondendum has given way to personal service in
summons or other form of notice, due process requires only that in order to subject
a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory
of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the mainte-
nance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.'
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. at 316 (citing Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S.
457, 463 (1940)).
27. The Court described the defendant corporation's interests as follows: "An 'estimate
of the inconveniences' which would result to the corporation from a trial away from its 'home'
or principal place of business is relevant in this connection." Id. at 317 (citing Hutchinson v.
Chase & Gilbert, 45 F.2d 139, 141 (2d Cir. 1930)). However, a state in which the corporation
was doing business has certain interests which could outweigh the corporation's interests in
convenience of litigation:
But to the extent that a corporation exercises the privilege of conducting activities
within a state, it enjoys the benefits and protection of the laws of that state. The
exercise of that privilege may give rise to obligations, and so far as those obliga-
tions arise out of or are connected with the activities within the state, a procedure
which requires the corporation to respond to a suit brought to enforce them can,
in most instances, hardly be said to be undue.
326 U.S. at 319.
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to defend in a distant forum; if the contacts with the forum state
are negligible or arise by chance, the burden on the defendant will
be too great to meet the requirements of the due process clause."Subsequent to International Shoe, the Supreme Court held
that an insurance contract solicited by a nonresident defendant
from a resident of the forum state was sufficient to confer personal
jurisdiction in a suit on the contract. 29 However, the minimum con-
tacts requirement of International Shoe were not met where a trust
company had no office in the state, transacted no business in the
state, none of its trust assets had ever been held or administered in
the state, and no manner of solicitation had been conducted there. 0
Despite the revision of the law concerning in personam jurisdic-
tion, the law governing quasi in rem jurisdiction remained substan-
tially consistent with the standard provided by Pennoyer v. Neff. A
state retained jurisdiction over all property within its boundaries,
regardless of the relationship among the disputants, the property
owner, and the forum state. Indicative of this analysis was the Su-
preme Court's decision in Harris v. Balk.3 Harris, a North Carolina
resident, was indebted to Balk, another North Carolina resident.
Balk was indebted to a Maryland resident. When Harris traveled to
Baltimore, the Maryland resident garnished Harris' obligation to
Balk in satisfaction of Balk's debt to him, all pursuant to a Mary-
land statute. The Court decided that this procedure was constitu-
tional. The Court reasoned that the debt was the subject of the
garnishment proceeding, that the debt followed the debtor, and that
the physical presence of the debtor was sufficient to confer jurisdic-
tion to adjudicate the claimant's interest in the debt.
The Pennoyer rationale was again applied to a quasi in rem
action in Seider v. Roth. 32 The New York Court of Appeals held that
an insurance company's contractual obligation to defend and in-
demnify its insured driver was a debt owing to the driver subject to
attachment under state law. Accordingly, Seider allowed a New
York resident to bring suit against a nonresident defendant for dam-
ages arising from an accident in a foreign jurisdiction so long as the
defendant's insurance company did business in New York.
Although Seider was widely criticized,3 3 the Court of Appeals
28. Developments, supra note 14, at 924 n.12.
29. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
30. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958). Florida had attempted to exercise jurisdic-
tion over trust assets in Delaware based upon the fact that the settlor-decedent had estab-
lished a Florida domicile.
31. 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
32. 17 N.Y.2d 111, 234 N.E.2d 669, 269 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1967).
.33. See Reese, The Expanding Scope of Jurisdiction Over Non-Residents - New York
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reaffirmed the Seider rule against a challenge to its constitutionality
in Simpson v. Loehman.34 In denying reargument in Simpson, the
court in a per curiam opinion announced a significant qualification
to the Seider rule, holding that recovery against the defendant
driver could not exceed the policy limits even if he appeared to
defend on the merits.
Reviewing Seider and Simpson, the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals held in Minichiello v. Rosenberg35 that the Seider rule did
not offend due process. Writing for the panel, Judge Friendly drew
an analogy between the Seider rule and the Louisiana direct action
statute sustained by the United States Supreme Court in Watson
v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp." Although the Louisiana
direct action statute applied only to accidents in Louisiana, he rea-
soned that New York's interest in providing a convenient forum for
its residents was sufficient to confer jurisdiction to adjudicate."
Following a rehearing en banc, Judge Friendly, again writing for the
majority, reaffirmed the court's holding and rested the decision
squarely upon Harris v. Balk, reasoning that while Harris v. Balk
stood firm, Seider was immune from constitutional attack.
Since Minichiello, some lower courts have held that mere pres-
ence of property is constitutionally insufficient to confer quasi in
rem jurisdiction. In United States Industries v. Gregg,3" the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals held, in response to a constitutional chal-
lenge to the Delaware sequestration statute, that International Shoe
provided the determinative test for jurisdiction, whether the juris-
diction be in personam, in rem, or quasi in rem."9 Judge Gibbons
expressed the same view in a concurring opinion in Jonnet v. Dollar
Savings Bank.40
In Shaffer v. Heitner, the United States Supreme Court finally
held that all claims of jurisdiction must be founded upon the mimi-
mum contacts test articulated in International Shoe. The holding
was based upon the premise that a court cannot exercise judicial
Goes Wild, 35 INs. COUNSEL J. 118 (1968); Comment, Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction Based on
Insurer's Obligations, 19 STAN. L. REv. 654 (1967).
34. 21 N.Y.2d 305, 234 N.E.2d 669, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1967), motion for reargument
denied, 21 N.Y.2d 990, 238 N.E.2d 319, 290 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1968).
35. 410 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1968).
36. 348 U.S. 66 (1954).
37. 410 F.2d at 110.
38. 540 F.2d 142 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 45 U.S.L.W. 3840 (U.S. June 28, 1977).
39. Gregg reversed the decision of the district court, 348 F. Supp. 1004 (D. Del. 1972).
In Greyhound Corp. v. Heitner, 361 A.2d. 225 (Del. 1976), rev'd sub nom. Shaffer v. Heitner,
97 S. Ct. 2569 (1977), the Delaware Supreme Court relied heavily upon the district court
decision in Gregg.
40. 530 F.2d 1123, 1136-37 (3d Cir. 1976) (Gibbons, J., concurring).
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authority over property without affecting the interests of the owner
in that property, thereby effectively asserting jurisdiction over the
person." Since in this case the only purpose of the sequestration
statute was to compel the appearance of the nonresident defen-
dants,42 the Court concluded that if a direct assertion of personal
jurisdiction were unconstitutional, then an indirect assertion of ju-
risdiction by attachment of property would be equally impermissi-
ble. The Court recognized that the traditional justifications for
treating the presence of property as a basis for jurisdiction no longer
held true. 3 The full faith and credit clause of the United States
Constitution had obviated the "self reliance" territorial justifica-
tion. Moreover, the tremendous mobility of modern society along
with the national character of corporate transactions could no longer
support the presence theory. The International Shoe standard must
govern actions in rem and quasi in rem as well as in personam; the
bases for jurisdiction in rem and quasi in rem must be sufficient to
justify exercising jurisdiction over the interests of persons in the res.
After postulating the proper test, the Court held that the contacts
which the nonresident defendants had with the state (statutory
presence of stock) were insufficient to support the exercise of juris-
diction.
In their concurring opinions, Justices Powell and Stevens ques-
tioned the scope of the decision. Justice Powell suggested that the
ownership of some forms of property could, without more, subject a
nonresident defendant to in rem jurisdiction.44
Justice Brennan agreed with the basic minimum contact prin-
ciple enunciated by the majority. In his dissent, however, Justice
Brennan forcefully argued that the defendants' status as corporate
directors was a sufficient contact under the newly articulated stan-
dard to render them amenable to the jurisdiction of the state of
incorporation.45 Stressing that this was a shareholder's derivative
action, brought on behalf of a corporation chartered by Delaware,
he contended that Delaware had strong interests in providing a
convenient forum for litigating claims involving many defendant
fiduciaries and in "vindicating the state's substantive policies re-
garding the management of its domestic corporations.'"
Justice Brennan articulated three interrelated public policies to
41. 97 S. Ct. at 2581.
42. Id. at 2583.
43. See text accompanying notes 12-13 supra.
44. 97 S. Ct. at 2587 (Powell, J., concurring).
45. Id. at 2589-93 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting).
46. Id. at 2590.
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enforce his contentions: 1) Delaware had a substantial interest in
vindicating the rights of corporations which had been victimized by
fiduciary misconduct;" 2) Delaware had a strong regulatory interest
in overseeing its local corporations;4" and, 3) since the corporation
was purely the creation of Delaware law, a shareholder's derivative
action would necessarily implicate the state's public policy.49 The
crucial factor, however, was that the corporate directors had volun-
tarily associated themselves with the state of Delaware. By
"invoking the benefits and protections of its laws,"5 they had be-
come responsible for compliance with those laws. Voluntary as-
sumption of responsibility by the directors provided the necessary
minimum contacts for the state successfully to assert jurisdiction
over the matter.
Justice Brennan addressed the sufficiency of the contacts only
after labelling the majority's examination of defendants' contacts
with Delaware an advisory opinion.' The inquiry appears to have
been necessary, however, since the Delaware sequestration statute
was not declared unconstitutional on its face, but only as applied
in this case in light of the articulated standard. Since the courts
below never attempted to determine whether there were sufficient
contacts to support the exercise of jurisdiction, perhaps the Court
should have remanded the case to the trial court for discovery pro-
ceedings concerning the sufficiency of the contacts, with directions
to apply the International Shoe standard.
In rejecting Pennoyer, Shaffer implicitly overruled Harris v.
Balk. The Court expressly criticized the assumption in Harris that
an attachment plaintiff could "represent" a nonresident creditor in
proceeding against a debt,"3 and suggested that Harris v. Balk
"might be thought inconsistent with the basic principle of reasona-
bleness." 4 The Court then observed that the minimum contacts
analysis would significantly affect the quasi in rem action typified
by Harris v. Balk, since under Shaffer "the presence of the property
alone would not support the state's jurisdiction. ' 5  However, the
Court declined to re-examine Harris v. Balk so as to determine




50. Id. at 2592 (citing Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)).
51. Id. at 2588.
52. Id. at 2587.
53. Id. at 2579 n.18.
54. Id. at 2581 n.21.
55. Id. at 2583.
[Vol. 32:667
NOTES
contacts analysis, holding instead that to the extent Harris was
inconsistent with that analysis, it was overruled.56
While the Court in Shaffer repeatedly criticized Harris v. Balk,
it made no reference whatsoever to Seider, Simpson, or Minichiello.
The conspicuous absence of those decisions from the majority as
well as the concurring opinions suggests that the Court chose to
defer consideration of the impact of its decision upon situations
typified by Seider. It would seem, however, that the Court must
inevitably conclude that there exist no significant contacts between
the forum state, the resident plaintiff, and the nonresident driver
defendant. When the question is posed in terms of the relationship
among the forum state, its resident plaintiff, and an insurance com-
pany doing business within the forum state, Shaffer provides no
easy answer. While an analysis concluding that the insurance com-
pany is the real party in interest suggests that Seider may survive
Shaffer," such an analysis fails to account for the very real impact
of the Seider rule upon the nonresident driver defendant." Since the
lawsuit cannot proceed in his absence, he is more than a nominal
party. It then follows that the minimum contacts analysis should
acknowledge the nonresident driver's interest in the litigation; if it
does, the Seider rule appears doomed. 9
The general rule which may be ascribed to Shaffer is this: if in
personam jurisdiction cannot be asserted in a given controversy,
actions in rem or quasi in rem will fail as well. The Court is thereby
recognizing the pre-eminence of the "minimum contacts" test,
clearly establishing this standard as the constitutionally compelled
touchstone for jurisdiction. By omission, however, the Court has
rendered uncertain the fate of some in rem or quasi in rem actions.
As the sole contact in a state, property may, even after Shaffer,
support an action against a nonresident if an alternative forum is
unavailable. Additionally, the Court may have allowed an escape
route from the rigid application of Shaffer, which was recognized in
both the majority opinion and in Justice Brennan's dissent. That
loophole would apparently allow a state to enact statutes expressly
for the purpose of exercising jurisdiction over the suits and activities
affecting state-created entities in order to further a compelling state
56. Id. at 2585 n.39.
57. See O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 46 U.S.L.W. 2184 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 1977).
58. By the terms of his contract, the nonresident defendant must cooperate in the de-
fense and may later be subject to a suit for a judgment in excess of the policy limits in which
he may be collaterally estopped from denying liability.
59. Should the Court overrule Seider, the question that will then arise is whether a
Seider action tolls the statute of limitations for the period during which it was pending.
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interest in the regulation of its corporations and the uniform appli-
cation of its laws.60
The concurring justices expressed concern over the uncertainty
of the International Shoe standard." While the decision makes more
sense than the "patchwork of legal aid factual fictions generated
from Pennoyer v. Neff," 2 disputes over fairness and reasonableness
as articulated in International Shoe will prove time consuming and
difficult. Questions surrounding the vitality of the Seider line of
decisions are evidence of the problems posed. Nevertheless, inter-
ests in expediency, simplicity, and uniformity cannot outweigh the
constitutional mandate of due process of law.
MARIA MASINTER
The Eighth Amendment, Rape, and Sexual
Battery: A Study in Methods of Judicial Review
A recent United States Supreme Court decision established a new
eighth amendment test for the constitutionality of punishment
which may be out of proportion with the severity of a crime. After
examining the Court's statement and use of this test for the rape
of an adult the author concludes that the Court's test is not
entirely satisfactory. Finally, the author applies the new test of
constitutionality of capital punishment to the crime of sexual
battery as defined in the Florida Statutes.
I. THE DEVELOPING EIGHTH AMENDMENT STANDARD
While serving three consecutive life terms and two twenty-year
terms for rape and murder convictions, the defendant escaped from
a Georgia correctional facility. Several hours later the defendant
unlawfully entered the victim's home. Brandishing a board and a
knife the defendant forced the victim to bind her husband, raped
her and escaped in the family automobile holding the victim as his
hostage. The defendant was apprehended shortly thereafter, having
caused no further harm to the victim. A jury found the defendant
60. For a general discussion of Shaffer v. Heitner, see The Supreme Court, 1976 Term,
91 HAv. L. Rav. 152 (1977). See generally In Personam Jurisdiction - Due Process and
Florida's Short "Long Arm", 23 U. FLA. L. REv. 336 (1971).
61. 97 S. Ct. at 2587 (Powell, J. and Stevens J., concurring).
62. Id. at 2588 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting).
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